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What lessons might we learn from the chip cards used for payments in Europe, now 
that America’s adopting them too? 
Americans are starting to get new credit cards with an embedded chip as well as the magnetic 
strip that has been in use since the 1970s. Named for its promoters Europay, MasterCard and Visa, 
the EMV system augments the old magnetic strip cards with a chip that can authenticate a trans-
action using cryptography – a so called “smart card”. EMV was deployed in the UK from 2003–6 
and in other European countries shortly afterwards; it’s now been rolled out from India to Cana-
da. The idea was to cut fraud drastically; but reality turned out to be somewhat harder than theo-
ry. As the graph shows, fraud in the UK went up, then down, and is now heading upwards again.
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Figure 1: U.K. card fraud by category during and since the introduction of EMV. (source: U.K. 
Payments Administration.)
The idea behind EMV is simple enough. The card is authenticated by a chip that’s a lot hard-
er to forge than the magnetic strip. The cardholder may be identified by a signature as be-
fore, or by a PIN; the chip has the ability to verify the PIN locally. Banks in the UK decid-
ed to use PIN verification wherever possible, so the system there is branded “chip and PIN”; 
in Singapore, it’s “chip and signature” as banks decided to continue using signatures at the 
point of sale. America looks like being a mixture, with some banks issuing chip-and-PIN cards 
and others going down the signature route. We may therefore be about to see a large natu-
ral experiment as to whether it’s better to authenticate transactions with a signature or a PIN.
The key question will be, “better for whom?” The European experience suggests that this will not be a 
straight fight between the fraudsters and everyone else. The interests of banks, merchants, regulators, 
vendors and consumers clash in interesting ways; the outcome won’t just be determined by how the 
fraudsters adapt to the technology, but by a complex tussle over who pays for the upgrade and who 
enjoys the benefits. Fraud savings are not the biggest game in town; while fraud costs America $3–4 
billion, interchange fees are a whopping $30 billion and EMV will likely have an impact on both.
Attacks
Although US banks are issuing EMV cards now, it will be some time before they start to see a reduc-
tion in fraud. Cards will still have the magnetic strip and banks will continue to accept magnetic strip 
transactions because it will take many years to upgrade all the ATMs and shop terminals. EMV ter-
minals still process unencrypted card numbers, expiry dates and PINs, so if hacked (as occurred in 
the 2014 Target data breach), criminals can steal enough data to perform fraudulent online purchas-
es. Also, as many chip cards still contain a full unencrypted copy of the magnetic strip data, the crim-
inals can steal this. If they can get  the PIN too, they can make forged cards and use them at an ATM.
EMV also introduces some new vulnerabilities. The first-wave EMV cards in the UK were cheap 
cards capable only of Static Data Authentication (SDA), where the card contains a certificate 
signed by the bank attesting the card data are genuine. Since this certificate is static, it is trivial to 
copy it to a counterfeit chip, which can be programmed to accept any PIN – a so-called “Yes-card”. 
Criminals exploited this flaw at a small scale in France, but elsewhere it was not a serious prob-
lem. The Yes-card attack can be defeated by online transactions where the merchant contacts the 
bank to verify that the card computed a correct message authentication code on the transaction 
data. (This uses a key shared between the card and the issuing bank, so the merchant must be on-
line for the code to be checked.) More modern EMV cards also support Dynamic Data Authen-
tication (DDA) which uses asymmetric cryptography and defeats the Yes-card attack even for of-
fline transactions. It is likely that US-issued EMV cards will support DDA and the vast majority of 
transactions will be online anyway, so the Yes-card attack is unlikely to be a major issue in the USA.
A much more serious type of fraud in the UK was tampering with Chip and PIN terminals to 
record card details and customer PINs. Although terminals were certified to be tamper resist-
ant, they weren’t, and the certification process was seriously flawed [2]. Criminals were able to 
modify terminals on a large scale to collect customer details as the card sent them to the ter-
minal, and the PIN entered by the customer as it was sent to the card for verification. Because 
most UK cards stored a copy of the magnetic strip on the chip, criminals could then make fake 
magnetic-strip ATM cards. Before the use of chip and PIN in the UK, customers signed for 
store transactions and PINs were only used at ATMs, so tampering with a store terminal didn’t 
yield enough information to withdraw cash from an ATM. Chip and PIN changed that; as mer-
chants started accepting PINs at the point of sale, card forgery became easier and more preva-
lent. As the graph shows, counterfeit card fraud went up after EMV was deployed, and took five 
years for it to fall back to the previous level. So US banks can expect a lot of attacks using com-
promised or counterfeit terminals until they can start turning off magnetic-strip fallback mode.
Another attack we worried about in the early days of EMV was the “relay attack”. This exploits 
the fact that while the card authenticates itself to the merchant terminal, the customer doesn’t 
know which terminal the card is communicating with. If a customer inserts her card into a fake 
terminal, it can relay a transaction with a quite different terminal. So a crook, Bob, can set up a 
fake parking meter in New York, and when an unwitting cardholder Alice uses it, Carol (who’s 
colluding with Bob) can stroll into Dave’s jewelry store in San Francisco and buy a diamond us-
ing a fake card connected to the reader in the parking meter. The poor cardholder thinks she 
paid $20 for a parking space, and gets a statement showing she spent $2,000 in a store she nev-
er visited. The counterfeit card inserted into the genuine terminal simply relays the transaction 
back to the genuine card via the fake terminal (see Figure 1). While there’s no real defence against 
the relay attack, it doesn’t scale well, so is likely only going to be used against high-value targets.
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Figure 2: The relay attack
A more serious vulnerability is the No-PIN attack [1]. Here a criminal who has stolen a card 
but doesn’t know the correct PIN can put a small electronic device between the stolen card 
and the terminal and use it with any PIN he likes. The device tricks the card into believing 
it’s doing a chip and signature transaction while making the terminal believe that the card ac-
cepted the PIN that was entered. This attack works against all types of card, and even for on-
line transactions. Fixing it properly would require a change to the EMV protocol, which 
would take years to agree. In the meantime it is often possible for the card-issuing bank to de-
tect the the attack by carefully comparing the card’s version of the transaction with the ter-
minal’s. So far it appears that only one UK bank is trying to do so. In the meantime French 
criminals have been caught exploiting a more sophisticated variant of this attack in the wild.
The latest family of attacks, seen in the last two or three years in Spain, exploits a classic cryp-
tographic vulnerability – the way in which EMV systems generate and use random num-
bers. When a terminal initiates an EMV transaction, it sends the card not just the date and the 
amount but a random number, so that each transaction is different and a crook cannot simply 
replay old transactions. However there are two flaws in this system. The first is an implementa-
tion flaw: it turns out that some ATMs generate predictable “random” numbers, so an attack-
er who has temporary access to someone else’s card (say, a waiter in a Mafia-owned restaurant) 
can calculate an authentication code that he can use at some predictable time in the future at 
a known ATM. Worse, there is a design flaw in that the terminal does not transmit its choice 
of random number to the bank in an authenticated way. This means for example that if a ter-
minal is running malicious software, it can harvest from a customer’s card a series of authen-
tication codes which it can then use to make extra transactions in the future, and it can fix up 
the random numbers in the protocol so that the issuing bank doesn’t notice anything suspi-
cious [3]. This is a serious attack because it can scale; a crime gang that managed to install mal-
ware on a number of legitimate terminals (as happened in the Target case) could harvest au-
thentication codes to authorise large numbers of transactions at businesses under its control.
Finally, the elephant in the room with EMV deployment is card-not-present (CNP) fraud (In-
ternet, phone and mail-order purchases). Although CNP fraud was low when EMV started to be 
deployed in the UK, it had grown to over half of UK card fraud by the time the roll-out was com-
plete. EMV does almost nothing to stop CNP fraud (cards were never designed to be connected 
to customer PCs, even if smart card readers were to become prevalent) and so the crooks’ initial 
reaction to the EMV deployment was just to take their business online, as we can see from the 
graph. US banks would be well advised to invest in further measures to mitigate CNP fraud rath-
er than putting their entire security budget into deploying EMV. EMVCo (the consortium which 
maintains the EMV standard) has already started work on a “tokenization” specification, allowing 
CNP transactions to be performed with limited-use tokens (in effect, one-time credit-card num-
bers) rather than a static credit card number, so reducing the damage resulting from merchant data 
breaches or malware on customer PCs. Tokenization has almost nothing to do with EMV chips, 
but rather than setting up an new industry body, the banks have drafted in EMVCo to deal with it.
The business battleground
When credit cards were first introduced by Diners’ Club in the 1960s, they had high fees; typi-
cally the merchant paid the bank 6% or more of transactions. The emergence in the 1970s of the 
Visa-MasterCard duopoly stabilised things with standard contracts for banks and merchants, 
technical standards so their computers could swap data, and standard fees at 2.5% for credit 
cards and 1.5% for debit. This enabled a huge expansion of the industry, and cards became the 
standard way to pay for items costing more than a few dollars. Card transaction processing has 
become a huge money-spinner for the banking industry, especially as the clunky old addres-
sograph machines for taking paper imprints were replaced by cheaper online systems, and as 
card payments spread online too. Many merchants see the card industry as an exploitative car-
tel, in need of trustbusting or competitive innovation.  In 2005 merchants filed a class-action 
suit against Visa and Mastercard; a settlement in 2013 lowered fees by 0.1% and allowed mer-
chants to charge customers the higher costs of credit-card transactions (which they already do 
in Europe). There has also been legislative action, with the Durbin amendment to the Dodd-
Frank bill empowering the Federal Reserve to write the rules for fees on debit card transactions.
The sums involved are large. A retailer like Walmart, for example, takes over $200bn in cred-
it-card sales; if these customers could be moved to PIN-based debit card transactions, that would 
save $2bn in fees. So some retailers have strongly supported the move to EMV. At the same time, 
the versions of the EMV protocol being introduced in the US to support contactless payments 
(such as where your credit card becomes an app on your NFC mobile phone) are designed to 
make it harder for merchants to move customers to debit card payments. These market dynam-
ics are unlike those seen in Canada or Europe, where the banking industry motivated merchants 
to install EMV terminals by means of a “liability shift”: the banks changed their terms and con-
ditions so that merchants were charged the cost of all customer disputes where a PIN was not 
used. Where a PIN was used, the banks would then pass the liability on to the cardholder, say-
ing “Your chip was read and your PIN was used, so you must have been negligent or complic-
it.” Such a liability shift would be more difficult in the USA because the retailers’ lobby is as 
powerful as the banks, and because consumer protection is better entrenched in US regulation.
Yet consumer protection may be undermined in a multitude of ways. One example is the protocol 
used to decide how to authenticate the cardholder. According to the EMV standards, each card 
has a cardholder verification method (CVM) list which states a preference such as ‘first, signa-
ture; then PIN’; the terminal should read this and use the highest-ranked method it supports. We 
would expect to see aggressive retailers programming their terminals to insist on a PIN when-
ever that’s supported, if (as we expect) the fee or liability for a PIN-based transaction is lower. In 
fact we have come across cases where merchants have simply lied to the banks about the method 
used. One fraud victim whose card was stolen while he was on holiday in Turkey was denied a re-
fund for a charge made to his card because the merchant reported it as PIN-based; he managed to 
get a copy of the till receipt and found that the thief had in fact signed for the goods. If you wish to 
avoid this sort of problem, it is prudent to demand a card that only supports chip-and-signature. 
Indeed, as the US will be the first country with a mixture of chip-and-pin and chip-and-sig-
nature cards in issue, we should be able to learn a lot from the crime figures after a few years. 
And this is not just about fraud, but robbery too. Chip-and-PIN cards are typically capable of 
offline PIN verification, and European banks have issued millions of card readers which ena-
ble cardholders to compute authentication codes for online banking. These readers can be used 
by muggers to check whether a victim is telling the truth when they demand his PIN as well 
as his cards; in one unfortunate case, two French students were tortured to death by robbers.
The most widespread problem encountered by cardholders, though is likely to be in dispute res-
olution. One of the problems thrown up by the experience in Europe is the lack of suitable tools 
for courts, arbitrators and even front-line dispute resolution staff in banks. When disputes arose 
with magnetic-strip cards, the consumer typically got the benefit of the doubt as these were wide-
ly known to be forgeable. EMV systems on the other hand create large amounts of log data which 
appear to be impressive but are often not understood, and can sometimes be the result of forgery 
by merchants (as in the Turkish case) or by malware on merchant terminals (as in the recent Target 
case, which would likely have been unaffected by the move to EMV). Also, the move from signature 
to PIN verification shifted dispute resolution in the banks favour. Any forged signature will likely 
be shown to be a forgery by later expert examination. In contrast, if the correct PIN was entered the 
fraud victim is left in the impossible position of having to prove that he did not negligently disclose it.
The main lesson to be learned here is that the collection, analysis and presentation of evidence 
is a function that needs to be specified, tested and debugged like any other. Simply dump-
ing many pages of printout on a court and leaving it to an expert to pore through the digits, 
comparing them with EMV manuals, is not a robust way to do things; often the necessary ev-
idence isn’t even retained. The forensic procedures also need to be open and transparent to 
stand up in court, and their governance needs to be improved; this problem cannot just be left 
to a disparate vendor community [5]. Here some guidance from the Fed would be welcome.
Conclusions
The EMV protocol is not a rigid way of doing card payments so much as a toolkit with which banks 
can build systems that can be pretty secure, but which can also be pretty awful. There is good news, 
and bad news. The good news is that EMV systems have been deployed in Europe for eleven years 
now, and there is a lot of experience to build on. Almost everything that could go wrong, has gone 
wrong: several protocol flaws which allowed attacks nobody had anticipated; tamper-resistance 
that didn’t work; certification schemes that turned out to be a sham; and evidence-collection sys-
tems that were not fit for purpose. These should not just be academic case studies for security en-
gineering classes, but should be studied by engineers who want to build robust payment systems.
The bad news is that the interests of banks, merchants, vendors, cardholders and regulators diverge 
in significant ways. In Europe, many failures were down to banks dumping liability on merchants 
and cardholders, who were in no position to defend themselves. In the US, the dynamic is different 
and more complex, with the main fight being over the interchange fees that the merchants pay the 
banks for processing their transactions. These fees are an order of magnitude greater than the fraud 
is, so we may find that the security of the system will be a side-effect of the project rather than its main 
goal. The details may be fought over for years to come in the courts and by lobbyists in Washington.
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